In this selection, Robert Kates explores the relationship between population, technology, and consumption, describing various ways of estimating the environmental degradation stemming from the interaction of these three factors. He discusses debates over how to define consumption and looks at different consumption patterns in the developed and in the developing worlds. He focuses his analysis around an updating of the so-called IPAT formula, an attempt by scientists to link resource impacts (I), population (P), affluence (A), and technology (T). In his conclusions, Kates draws attention to additional factors that we still only dimly understand, particularly the human desire to consume—issues such as satisfaction, satiation, and sublimation.

A member of the National Academy of Sciences, Kates teaches at Brown University; in his research, he addresses long-term population dynamics, global environmental change, and the prevalence and persistence of hunger.

Thirty years ago, as Earth Day dawned, three wise men recognized three proximate causes of environmental degradation yet spent half a decade or more arguing their relative importance. In this classic environmentalist feud between Barry Commoner on one side and Paul Ehrlich and John Holdren on the other, all three recognized that growth in population, affluence, and technology were jointly responsible for environmental problems, but they strongly differed about their relative importance. Commoner asserted that technology and the economic system that produced it were primarily responsible. Ehrlich and Holdren asserted the importance of all three drivers: population, affluence,
and technology. But given Ehrlich's writings on population, the differences were often, albeit incorrectly, described as an argument over whether population or technology was responsible for the environmental crisis.

Now, 30 years later, a general consensus among scientists posits that growth in population, affluence, and technology are jointly responsible for environmental problems. This has become enshrined in a useful, albeit overly simplified, identity known as IPAT, first published by Ehrlich and Holdren in *Environment* in 1972 in response to the more limited version by Commoner that had appeared earlier in *Environment* and in his famous book *The Closing Circle*. In this identity, various forms of environmental or resource impacts (I) equals population (P) times affluence (A) (usually income per capita) times the impacts per unit of income as determined by technology (T) and the institutions that use it. Academic debate has now shifted from the greater or lesser importance of each of these driving forces of environmental degradation or resource depletion to debate about their interaction and the ultimate forces that drive them.

However, in the wider global realm, the debate about who or what is responsible for environmental degradation lives on. Today, many Earth Days later, international debates over such major concerns as biodiversity, climate change, or sustainable development address the population and the affluence terms of Holdren's and Ehrlich's identity, specifically focusing on the character of consumption that affluence permits. The concern with technology is more complicated because it is now widely recognized that while technology can be a problem, it can be a solution as well. The development and use of more environmentally benign and friendly technologies in industrialized countries have slowed the growth of many of the most pernicious forms of pollution that originally drew Commoner's attention and still dominate Earth Day concerns.

A recent report from the National Research Council captures one view of the current public debate, and it begins as follows:

For over two decades, the same frustrating exchange has been repeated countless times in international policy circles. A government official or scientist from a wealthy country would make the following argument: The world is threatened with environmental disaster because of the depletion of natural resources (or climate change or the loss of biodiversity), and it cannot continue for long to support its rapidly growing population. To preserve the environment for future generations, we need to move quickly to control global population growth, and we must concentrate the effort on the world's poorer countries, where the vast majority of population growth is occurring.

Government officials and scientists from low-income countries would typically respond:
If the world is facing environmental disaster, it is not the fault of the poor, who use few resources. The fault must lie with the world's wealthy countries, where people consume the great bulk of the world's natural resources and energy and cause the great bulk of its environmental degradation. We need to curtail overconsumption in the rich countries which use far more than their fair share, both to preserve the environment and to allow the poorest people on Earth to achieve an acceptable standard of living.5

It would be helpful, as in all such classic disputes, to begin by laying out what is known about the relative responsibilities of both population and consumption for the environmental crisis, and what might need to be known to address them. However, there is a profound asymmetry that must fuel the frustration of the developing countries' politicians and scientists: namely, how much people know about population and how little they know about consumption. Thus, this article begins by examining these differences in knowledge and action and concludes with the alternative actions needed to go from more to enough in both population and consumption.6

Population

What population is and how it grows is well understood even if all the forces driving it are not. Population begins with people and their key events of birth, death, and location. At the margins, there is some debate over when life begins and ends or whether residence is temporary or permanent, but little debate in between. Thus, change in the world's population or any place is the simple arithmetic of adding births, subtracting deaths, adding immigrants, and subtracting outmigrants. While whole subfields of demography are devoted to the arcane details of these additions and subtractions, the error in estimates of population for almost all places is probably within 20 percent and for countries with modern statistical services, under 3 percent—better estimates than for any other living things and for most other environmental concerns.

Current world population is more than six billion people, growing at a rate of 1.3 percent per year. The peak annual growth rate in all history—about 2.1 percent—occurred in the early 1960s, and the peak population increase of around 87 million per year occurred in the late 1980s. About 80 percent or 4.8 billion people live in the less developed areas of the world, with 1.2 billion living in industrialized countries. Population is now projected by the United Nations (UN) to be 8.9 billion in 2050, according to its medium fertility assumption, the one usually considered most likely, or as high as 10.6 billion or as low as 7.3 billion.7

A general description of how birth rates and death rates are changing over time is a process called the demographic transition.8 It was first studied
in the context of Europe, where in the space of two centuries, societies went from a condition of high births and high deaths to the current situation of low births and low deaths. In such a transition, deaths decline more rapidly than births, and in that gap, population grows rapidly but eventually stabilizes as the birth decline matches or even exceeds the death decline. Although the general description of the transition is widely accepted, much is debated about its cause and details.

The world is now in the midst of a global transition that, unlike the European transition, is much more rapid. Both births and deaths have dropped faster than experts expected and history foreshadowed. It took 100 years for deaths to drop in Europe compared to the drop in 30 years in the developing world. Three is the current global average of births per woman of reproductive age. This number is more than halfway between the average of five children born to each woman at the post-World War II peak of population growth and the average of 2.1 births required to achieve eventual zero population growth. The death transition is more advanced, with life expectancy currently at 64 years. This represents three-quarters of the transition between a life expectancy of 40 years to one of 75 years. The current rates of decline in births outpace the estimates of the demographers, the UN having reduced its latest medium expectation of global population in 2050 to 8.9 billion, a reduction of almost 10 percent from its projection in 1994.

Demographers debate the causes of this rapid birth decline. But even with such differences, it is possible to break down the projected growth of the next century and to identify policies that would reduce projected populations even further. John Bongaarts of the Population Council has decomposed the projected developing country growth into three parts and, with his colleague Judith Bruce, has envisioned policies that would encourage further and more rapid decline. The first part is unwanted fertility, making available the methods and materials for contraception to the 120 million married women (and the many more unmarried women) in developing countries who in survey research say they either want fewer children or want to space them better. A basic strategy for doing so links voluntary family planning with other reproductive and child health services.

Yet in many parts of the world, the desired number of children is too high for a stabilized population. Bongaarts would reduce this desire for large families by changing the costs and benefits of childrearing so that more parents would recognize the value of smaller families while simultaneously increasing their investment in children. A basic strategy for doing so accelerates three trends that have been shown to lead to lower desired family size: the survival of children, their education, and improvement in the economic, social, and legal status for girls and women.

However, even if fertility could immediately be brought down to the replacement level of two surviving children per woman, population growth
would continue for many years in most developing countries because so many more young people of reproductive age exist. So Bongaarts would slow this momentum of population growth by increasing the age of childbearing, primarily by improving secondary education opportunity for girls and by addressing such neglected issues as adolescent sexuality and reproductive behavior.

How much further could population be reduced? Bongaarts provides the outer limits. The population of the developing world (using older projections) was expected to reach 10.2 billion by 2100. In theory, Bongaarts found that meeting the unmet need for contraception could reduce this total by about 2 billion. Bringing down desired family size to replacement fertility would reduce the population a billion more, with the remaining growth—from 4.5 billion today to 7.3 billion in 2100—due to population momentum. In practice, however, a recent U.S. National Academy of Sciences report concluded that a 10 percent reduction is both realistic and attainable and could lead to a lessening in projected population numbers by 2050 of upwards of a billion fewer people.11

Consumption

In contrast to population, where people and their births and deaths are relatively well-defined biological events, there is no consensus as to what consumption includes. Paul Stern of the National Research Council has described the different ways physics, economics, ecology, and sociology view consumption.12 For physicists, matter and energy cannot be consumed, so consumption is conceived as transformations of matter and energy with increased entropy. For economists, consumption is spending on consumer goods and services and thus distinguished from their production and distribution. For ecologists, consumption is obtaining energy and nutrients by eating something else, mostly green plants or other consumers of green plants. And for some sociologists, consumption is a status symbol—keeping up with the Joneses—when individuals and households use their incomes to increase their social status through certain kinds of purchases.

In 1977 the councils of the Royal Society of London and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences issued a joint statement on consumption, having previously done so on population. They chose a variant of the physicist’s definition:

Consumption is the human transformation of materials and energy. Consumption is of concern to the extent that it makes the transformed materials or energy less available for future use, or negatively impacts biophysical systems in such a way as to threaten human health, welfare, or other things people value.13
On the one hand, this society/academy view is more holistic and fundamental than the other definitions; on the other hand, it is more focused, turning attention to the environmentally damaging. This article uses it as a working definition with one modification, the addition of information to energy and matter, thus completing the triad of the biophysical and ecological basics that support life.

In contrast to population, only limited data and concepts on the transformation of energy, materials, and information exist. There is relatively good global knowledge of energy transformations due in part to the common units of conversion between different technologies. Between 1950 and today, global energy production and use increased more than fourfold. For material transformations, there are no aggregate data in common units on a global basis, only for some specific classes of materials including materials for energy production, construction, industrial minerals and metals, agricultural crops, and water. Calculations of material use by volume, mass, or value lead to different trends.

Trend data for per capita use of physical structure materials (construction and industrial minerals, metals, and forestry products) in the United States are relatively complete. They show an inverted S shaped (logistic) growth pattern: modest doubling between 1900 and the depression of the 1930s (from two to four metric tons), followed by a steep quintupling with economic recovery until the early 1970s (from two to eleven tons), followed by a leveling off since then with fluctuations related to economic downturns. An aggregate analysis of all current material production and consumption in the United States averages more than 60 kilos per person per day (excluding water). Most of this material flow is split between energy and related products (38 percent) and minerals for construction (37 percent), with the remainder as industrial minerals (5 percent), metals (2 percent), products of fields (12 percent) and forest (5 percent).

A massive effort is under way to catalog biological (genetic) information and to sequence the genomes of microbes, worms, plants, mice, and people. In contrast to the molecular detail, the number and diversity of organisms is unknown, but a conservative estimate places the number of species on the order of 10 million, of which only one-tenth have been described. Although there is much interest and many anecdotes, neither concepts nor data are available on most cultural information. For example, the number of languages in the world continues to decline while the number of messages expands exponentially.

Trends and projections in agriculture, energy, and economy can serve as surrogates for more detailed data on energy and material transformation. From 1950 to the early 1990s, world population more than doubled (2.2 times), food as measured by grain production almost tripled (2.7 times), energy more than quadrupled (4.4 times), and the economy quintupled (5.1 times).
43-year record is similar to a current 55-year projection (1995–2050) that assumes the continuation of current trends or, as some would note, “business as usual.” In this 55-year projection, growth in half again of population (1.6 times) finds almost a doubling of agriculture (1.8 times), more than twice as much energy used (2.4 times), and a quadrupling of the economy (4.3 times). Thus, both history and future scenarios predict growth rates of consumption well beyond population. An attractive similarity exists between a demographic transition that moves over time from high births and high deaths to low births and low deaths with an energy, materials, and information transition. In this transition, societies will use increasing amounts of energy and materials as consumption increases, but over time the energy and materials input per unit of consumption decrease and information substitutes for more material and energy inputs.

Some encouraging signs surface for such a transition in both energy and materials, and these have been variously labeled as decarbonization and dematerialization. For more than a century, the amount of carbon per unit of energy produced has been decreasing. Over a shorter period, the amount of energy used to produce a unit of production has also steadily declined. There is also evidence for dematerialization, using fewer materials for a unit of production, but only for industrialized countries and for some specific materials. Overall, improvements in technology and substitution of information for energy and materials will continue to increase energy efficiency (including decarbonization) and dematerialization per unit of product or service. Thus, over time, less energy and materials will be needed to make specific things. At the same time, the demand for products and services continues to increase, and the overall consumption of energy and most materials more than offsets these efficiency and productivity gains.

What to Do about Consumption

While quantitative analysis of consumption is just beginning, three questions suggest a direction for reducing environmentally damaging and resource-depleting consumption. The first asks: When is more too much for the life-support systems of the natural world and the social infrastructure of human society? Not all the projected growth in consumption may be resource-depleting—“less available for future use”—or environmentally damaging in a way that “negatively impacts biophysical systems to threaten human health, welfare, or other things people value.” Yet almost any human-induced transformations turn out to be either or both resource-depleting or damaging to some valued environmental component. For example, a few years ago, a series of eight energy controversies in Maine were related to coal, nuclear, natural gas, hydroelectric, biomass, and wind generating sources, as well as to various energy policies. In all the controversies, competing sides, often more
than two, emphasized environmental benefits to support their choice and attributed environmental damage to the other alternatives.

Despite this complexity, it is possible to rank energy sources by the varied and multiple risks they pose and, for those concerned, to choose which risks they wish to minimize and which they are more willing to accept. There is now almost 30 years of experience with the theory and methods of risk assessment and 10 years of experience with the identification and setting of environmental priorities. While there is still no readily accepted methodology for separating resource-depleting or environmentally damaging consumption from general consumption or for identifying harmful transformations from those that are benign, one can separate consumption into more or less damaging and depleting classes and shift consumption to the less harmful class. It is possible to substitute less damaging and depleting energy and materials for more damaging ones. There is growing experience with encouraging substitution and its difficulties: renewables for nonrenewables, toxics with fewer toxics, ozone-depleting chemicals for more benign substitutes, natural gas for coal, and so forth.

The second question, Can we do more with less?, addresses the supply side of consumption. Beyond substitution, shrinking the energy and material transformations required per unit of consumption is probably the most effective current means for reducing environmentally damaging consumption. In the 1997 book, Stuff: The Secret Lives of Everyday Things, John Ryan and Alan Durning of Northwest Environment Watch trace the complex origins, materials, production, and transport of such everyday things as coffee, newspapers, cars, and computers and highlight the complexity of reengineering such products and reorganizing their production and distribution.

Yet there is growing experience with the three Rs of consumption shrinkage: reduce, recycle, reuse. These have now been strengthened by a growing science, technology, and practice of industrial ecology that seeks to learn from nature’s ecology to reuse everything. These efforts will only increase the existing favorable trends in the efficiency of energy and material usage. Such a potential led the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to conclude that it was possible, using current best practice technology, to reduce energy use by 30 percent in the short run and 50–60 percent in the long run. Perhaps most important in the long run, but possibly least studied, is the potential for and value of substituting information for energy and materials. Energy and materials per unit of consumption are going down, in part because more and more consumption consists of information.

The third question addresses the demand side of consumption: When is more enough? Is it possible to reduce consumption by more satisfaction with what people already have, by satiation, no more needing more because there is enough, and by sublimation, having more satisfaction with less to
achieve some greater good? This is the least explored area of consumption and the most difficult. There are, of course, many signs of satiation for some goods. For example, people in the industrialized world no longer buy additional refrigerators (except in newly formed households) but only replace them. Moreover, the quality of refrigerators has so improved that a 20-year or more life span is commonplace. The financial pages include frequent stories of the plight of this industry or corporation whose markets are saturated and whose products no longer show the annual growth equated with profits and progress. Such enterprises are frequently viewed as failures of marketing or entrepreneurship rather than successes in meeting human needs sufficiently and efficiently. Is it possible to reverse such views, to create a standard of satiation, a satisfaction in a need well met?

Can people have more satisfaction with what they already have by using it more intensely and having the time to do so? Economist Juliet Schor tells of some overworked Americans who would willingly exchange time for money, time to spend with family and using what they already have, but who are constrained by an uncooperative employment structure. Proposed U.S. legislation would permit the trading of overtime for such compensatory time off, a step in this direction. Sublimation, according to the dictionary, is the diversion of energy from an immediate goal to a higher social, moral, or aesthetic purpose. Can people be more satisfied with less satisfaction derived from the diversion of immediate consumption for the satisfaction of a smaller ecological footprint? An emergent research field grapples with how to encourage consumer behavior that will lead to change in environmentally damaging consumption.

A small but growing “simplicity” movement tries to fashion new images of “living the good life.” Such movements may never much reduce the burdens of consumption, but they facilitate by example and experiment other less-demanding alternatives. Peter Menzel’s remarkable photo essay of the material goods of some 30 households from around the world is powerful testimony to the great variety and inequality of possessions amidst the existence of alternative lifestyles. Can a standard of “more is enough” be linked to an ethic of “enough for all”? One of the great discoveries of childhood is that eating lunch does not feed the starving children of some far-off place. But increasingly, in sharing the global commons, people flirt with mechanisms that hint at such—a rationing system for the remaining chlorofluorocarbons, trading systems for reducing emissions, rewards for preserving species, or allowances for using available resources.

A recent compilation of essays, Consuming Desires: Consumption, Culture, and the Pursuit of Happiness, explores many of these essential issues. These elegant essays by 14 well-known writers and academics ask the fundamental question of why more never seems to be enough and why satiation
and sublimation are so difficult in a culture of consumption. Indeed, how is the culture of consumption different for mainstream America, women, inner-city children, South Asian immigrants, or newly industrializing countries?

**Why We Know and Don’t Know**

In an imagined dialog between rich and poor countries, with each side listening carefully to the other, they might ask themselves just what they actually know about population and consumption. Struck with the asymmetry described above, they might then ask: “Why do we know so much more about population than consumption?”

The answer would be that population is simpler, easier to study, and a consensus exists about terms, trends, even policies. Consumption is harder, with no consensus as to what it is, and with few studies except in the fields of marketing and advertising. But the consensus that exists about population comes from substantial research and study, much of it funded by governments and groups in rich countries, whose asymmetric concern readily identifies the troubling fertility behavior of others and only reluctantly considers their own consumption behavior. So while consumption is harder, it is surely studied less.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A Comparison of Population and Consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simpler, easier to study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well-funded research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus terms, trends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus policies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Robert W. Kates

The asymmetry of concern is not very flattering to people in developing countries. Anglo-Saxon tradition has a long history of dominant thought holding the poor responsible for their condition—they have too many children—and an even longer tradition of urban civilization feeling besieged by the barbarians at their gates. But whatever the origins of the asymmetry, its persistence does no one a service. Indeed, the stylized debate of population versus consumption reflects neither popular understanding nor scientific insight. Yet lurking somewhere beneath the surface concerns lies a deeper fear.

Consumption is more threatening, and despite the North-South rhetoric, it is threatening to all. In both rich and poor countries alike, making and
the economic system. No longer challenged by socialism, global capitalism seems inherently based on growth—growth of both consumers and their consumption. To study consumption in this light is to risk concluding that a transition to sustainability might require profound changes in the making and selling of things and in the opportunities that this provides. To draw such conclusions, in the absence of convincing alternative visions, is fearful and to be avoided.

What We Need to Know and Do

In conclusion, returning to the 30-year-old IPAT identity—a variant of which might be called the Population/Consumption (PC) version—and restating that identity in terms of population and consumption, it would be: \( I = \frac{P \times C}{P \times I} \), where \( I \) equals environmental degradation and/or resource depletion; \( P \) equals the number of people or households; and \( C \) equals the transformation of energy, materials, and information.

With such an identity as a template, and with the goal of reducing environmentally degrading and resource-depleting influences, there are at least seven major directions for research and policy. To reduce the level of impacts per unit of consumption, it is necessary to separate out more damaging consumption and \textit{shift} to less harmful forms, \textit{shrink} the amounts of environmentally damaging energy and materials per unit of consumption, and \textit{substitute} information for energy and materials. To reduce consumption per person or household, it is necessary to \textit{satisfy} more with what is already had, \textit{satiate}
well-met consumption needs, and sublimate wants for a greater good. Finally, it is possible to slow population growth and then to stabilize population numbers as indicated above.

However, as with all versions of the IPAT identity, population and consumption in the PC version are only proximate driving forces, and the ultimate forces that drive consumption, the consuming desires, are poorly understood, as are many of the major interventions needed to reduce these proximate driving forces. People know most about slowing population growth, more about shrinking and substituting environmentally damaging consumption, much about shifting to less damaging consumption, and least about satisfaction, satiation, and sublimation. Thus the determinants of consumption and its alternative patterns have been identified as a key understudied topic for an emerging sustainability science by the recent U.S. National Academy of Sciences study.33

But people and society do not need to know more in order to act. They can readily begin to separate out the most serious problems of consumption, shrink its energy and material throughputs, substitute information for energy and materials, create a standard for satiation, sublimate the possession of things for that of the global commons, as well as slow and stabilize population. To go from more to enough is more than enough to do for 30 more Earth Days.

Notes


12. See Stern et al., note 5 above.


